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In 1623, the English poet John Donne wrote, "No man is an island, entire
of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main." In an
increasingly globalized world, the same is true of nations. Even the United
States, the sole remaining superpower, is a part of the globe, connected to other
countries in myriad ways.
Our Founding Fathers were keenly aware of this fact. In the Declaration
of Independence, Thomas Jefferson emphasized the importance of paying a
"decent respect to the opinions of mankind." James Madison expressed a
similar sentiment in The Federalist Papers, writing, "An attention to the
judgment of other nations is important to every government.... [un doubtful
cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong
passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial
world may be the best guide that can be followed." As he rhetorically asked,
"What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and
how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and
propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the
light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?"2
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has paid a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind, looking to foreign sources and international law as
indicators of the "opinions of the impartial world." Two years ago, in Atkins
v. Virginia, the court held that executing mentally retarded persons constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In
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reaching this result, the Court noted "within the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."4 Last year, in Lawrence v. Texas,5
the Court struck down a law criminalizing homosexual sodomy between
consenting adults, reversing its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.6 The
majority cited three decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, noting
[T]he reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has followed
not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirma-
tion of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct. The right the petitioners seek in
this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom
in many other countries.7
International law is also likely to play a role in Roper v. Simmons, a Missouri
case that the Supreme Court recently accepted, involving capital punishment
of a juvenile offender, a practice engaged in by only a handful of countries
other than the United States, including such paragons of justice as Libya and
Iran.
The notion that we do not have a monopoly on wisdom and could learn
from others might seem uncontroversial, particularly to the Framers of the
Constitution. But it has provoked a strong reaction in some quarters. In
Lawrence, for example, Justice Scalia characterized the reference to foreign
views as "meaningless" and "dangerous" "dicta."8 Similarly Justice Thomas,
in Foster v. Florida, belittled deeply held values concerning the death penalty
by referring to them as "foreign moods, fads, or fashions," and raised alarm
bells that these "foreign moods, fads, or fashions" might somehow be
"impose[d]" on Americans.9 And, in his recent book, Coercing Virtue, Robert
Bork characterized the appeal of internationalism as "insidious."'
4 Id. at 316 n.21.
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My argument for the use of international materials to interpret the
Constitution will proceed in four parts. First, I will argue that international
law has a venerable history in constitutional interpretation. Second, I will
argue that American courts and foreign courts are engaged in a common legal
enterprise and could learn from one another. Third, I will argue that the text
of certain constitutional provisions invites the use of international materials.
Finally, I will argue that taking international opinion into account has strong
pragmatic justifications.
But before considering these arguments, first, a word of clarification.
Much of the debate in cases like Atkins and Lawrence was not about the use
of international law per se in constitutional interpretation, but about the use of
international sources more generally. The argument in these cases was not that
the United States, as a matter of international law, may not execute mentally
retarded persons or may not criminalize homosexual sodomy. Indeed, if
international law did prohibit these practices, then it would apply independ-
ently of the Constitution as part of our law. Instead, the role of international
materials in these cases was much looser and more indirect, as will presumably
be true of the juvenile death penalty case currently before the Court."
With this preliminary matter out of the way, let me turn to my first
argument, namely that the use of international law in constitutional interpreta-
tion is far from new. The Founding Fathers themselves had a healthy respect
for international law. Thomas Jefferson, for example, characterized the law
of nations (as international law was then called) as "an integral part... of the
laws of the land." Similarly, the first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph,
who had himself been a delegate at the Constitutional Convention, wrote an
official opinion as Attorney General stating, "The law of nations, though not
specially adopted by the constitution, or any municipal act, is essentially a part
of the law of the land."
So it should not be surprising that the Supreme Court has often turned to
international law in construing the powers of the federal government. 2 The
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court has found a number of implied or inherent federal powers based on the
view that the United States should have all the powers of a sovereign nation
under international law, including:
1. the power to acquire new territory by discovery and occupation;1 3
2. the power to exclude or expel aliens;' 4 and
3. the power to compel citizens residing abroad to return.'
The Supreme Court has also looked to international law to construe the
jurisdictional reach of constitutional provisions such as the Eighteenth
Amendment, which instituted Prohibition.' 6
So my first point is simply this: the use of international law in constitu-
tional interpretation has a long history, and reflects the Framers' own interest
in, and concern about, international law.
Let me turn to my second point, which is that international sources are
relevant to constitutional interpretation because American courts and foreign
courts are part of a common legal enterprise. Justice Breyer has emphasized
this point, noting that judges everywhere face the "same species of problems
armed with the same species of legal instruments," and that there is "enormous
value in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience of
others."' 7 Even Justice Rehnquist has written, "now that constitutional law is
solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts
begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own
deliberative process."' 8
International sources can be useful for two reasons. First, they can be a
source of good ideas. As the Supreme Court noted in Hurtado v. California
in upholding a state criminal proceeding based on an information rather than
a grand jury indictment:
82, 83 (2004).
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IS Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,437-38 (1932).
16 Cunard S.S. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122-24 (1923) (geographical scope of 18th
Amendment interpreted in light of international law regarding coastal state jurisdiction).
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[w]hile we take just pride in the principles and institutions of the
common law, we are not to forget that in lands where other
systems of jurisprudence prevail, the ideas and processes of civil
justice are also not unknown ... There is nothing in Magna
Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and
law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of
every age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the
common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of
justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have
been exhausted. 9
In addition, by looking to foreign sources, we can get empirical evidence
about how a prospective legal rule operates in practice. This point was
emphasized by Justice Breyer in Printz v. United States, when he noted: "Of
course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations,
and there may be relevant political and structural differences between their
systems and our own. ... But their experience may nonetheless cast an
empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem."2 Harold Koh, the new Dean of Yale Law School, makes the same
point, when he argues that we should use "the experience of other nations that
share [our] ... constitutional genealogy as laboratories to test workable social
solutions to common constitutional problems."'"
A third basic reason for looking to international law in interpreting the
Constitution is that the constitutional text itself is often open-ended and invites
the use of community standards as a means of interpretation. 2 Some examples
of open-ended provisions include:
1. the "cruel and unusual punishment" standard in the Eighth Amendment;
2. the notion of "due process of law" in the Fifth Amendment;
3. the prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures" in the Fourth
Amendment.
Justice Scalia in Stanford v. Kentucky argued that the community standards
implicit in these phrases are domestic standards. As he said, it is "American
conceptions of decency that are dispositive."' 3 But concepts such as "ordered
19 110U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
1 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll, 977 (1997).
21 Harold H. Koh, International Law as Pail of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'LL, 43, 47 (2004).
' Cf. Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal
Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 3 (1983).
' 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989).
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
liberty" are not unique to American jurisprudence; they are part of a larger
legal tradition that informed the drafting of the Constitution and should
continue to inform how the Constitution is interpreted today.24
Consider, for example, the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in
the Eighth Amendment. In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court said that the
Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."25 And, in that case, in
finding that denationalization constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the
court looked not just to domestic concepts; it "took pains to note the climate
of international opinion concerning the acceptability" of denationalization, 26
describing statelessness as "a condition deplored in the international commu-
nity of democracies." Similarly, in Enmund v. Florida,27 the Court struck
down the felony murder rule, noting that the rule had been abolished in
England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other
Commonwealth countries, and was unknown in continental Europe.
The same kind of interpretive issues arise in interpreting the "concept of
ordered liberty" implicit in the due process clause. In Rochin v. California, the
Supreme Court said that the due process clauses obliges courts to ascertain
whether law or practice offends "those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples."'
In contrast to today, I am not aware that when the Court, in these earlier
cases, paid a decent respect to the opinions of mankind, this was criticized as
illegitimate or otherwise un-American. Or invited the kind of debate we are
having here today.
24 See Koh, supra note 21, at 47
The United States has never been a hermetically sealed legal system. It shares
a common legal heritage, tradition and history with many foreign constitu-
tional systems. For that reason, constitutional concepts like 'liberty,' 'equal
protection,' 'due process of law,' and privacy have never been exclusive U.S.
property, but have long carried global meaning.
Id; cf. Edward S. Corwin, THE "IGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw (1955).
5 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
26 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
27 458 U.S. 782, 797 n.22 (1982).
23 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). Even Michael Ramsey, a federalist critic of the use of
international materials in constitutional interpretation, admits that "if the universal practice of
the world were to recognize a right, that seems powerful evidence that the practice may be
'implicit in the cost of ordered liberty' (or, in the specific context of the Eighth Amendment, that
it may be 'cruel and unusual')." Ramsey, supra note 11, at 76.
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This year, the Court will be faced with a similar type of issue, this time
concerning thej uvenile death penalty. The United States stands virtually alone
in openly executing juvenile offenders. Only Somalia, Congo, Pakistan, and
Nigeria openly admit to executing juvenile offenders-not exactly good
company. The Supreme Court has vacillated on this issue. In a 1988 case, it
looked to international opinion in holding that the execution of a person for a
crime committed at the age of fifteen or younger constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.29 But the following year, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia,
the Court dismissed international sources as irrelevant in upholding the
execution of a person for a crime committed at the age of sixteen.30
The recent grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons
may signal that the Court is considering reversing fields once again, back to a
more internationalist orientation. Let us hope that, this time, the third try
really is a charm!
A fourth and final reason to look to international materials in interpreting
the Constitution is pragmatic: it helps avoid friction with the rest of world. In
Atkins, which as you may recall involved capital punishment of a mentally
retarded person, a group of American diplomats filed an amicus brief arguing
that the execution would "strain diplomatic relations with close American
allies, provide diplomatic ammunition to countries with demonstrably worse
human rights records, increase American isolation and impair other United
States foreign policy interests." These are not trivial problems at a time when
the United States is actively seeking to enlist the assistance of other countries
in the ongoing war against terrorism. The policy interest in avoiding friction
with the rest of the world is reflected in the Charming Betsy doctrine, which
states that, wherever possible, statutes, and presumably the Constitution as
well, should be construed so as to be consistent with international norms.3
219 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
30 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 937 (1989).
3' Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains...."); see Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon
of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1181 (1990) (some courts, in
applying the Charming Betsy rule, have consulted standards that do not easily qualify as
international law binding on the United States).
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Critics of international law simultaneously see it as a toothless joke and as
a overbearing and insidious threat to American sovereignty. Both views, of
course, cannot be the case. The truth, as usual, lies somewhere in between.
International law is simply a tool-created, applied and enforced primarily by
states-in order to achieve a more just and ordered world.
The use of international law in constitutional interpretation does not
"impose" anything on the United States, be they fundamental values or passing
fads. It is, instead, a resource thatjudges-American judges--can draw upon
in answering difficult questions of constitutional law. Its use reflects a
humility that is becoming to a superpower. It reflects the kind of decent
respect for the opinions of mankind that the Framers prized and that we should
continue to value today.
